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 No subject in securities regulation has generated more heat and less light than 
short selling. A short sale is the sale of a share that is borrowed from a third party 
rather than owned by the seller. At a later time, the short seller extinguishes her 
obligation to this third party by “covering”—purchasing an identical share in the 
market and then returning it to the third party. If the share price drops, the cost of 
covering will be less than the proceeds received earlier from the sale and the short 
seller will make money. Politicians and CEOs rail against short selling as a 
manipulative tool that artificially pushes share prices below their fundamental 
values.1 Most finance theorists, in contrast, extol short selling’s virtues as a practice 
that helps to quickly incorporate new information into share prices, and thus enhances 
price accuracy.2 Short selling, in their view, also provides valuable liquidity to the 
market and aids investors in hedging against risk.3 Short sales account for 31% of all 
sales for NASDAQ listed stocks and 24% of all New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) 
listed stocks.4 They are thus an important phenomenon, certainly big enough to 
affect prices.
 Despite the longstanding controversy over this important force in the market, the 
empirical study of short selling’s actual effects, using daily trading data, is in its 
infancy. By examining the relationship between news and short selling, our project 
seeks to enlarge the highly incomplete understanding of the causes and effects of 
short selling and of the impact of attempts to regulate it. Specifically, we seek to 
determine the so far unexplored relationship between short selling in an issuer’s 
shares and news about the issuer in the time immediately surrounding such 
transactions. This article is a report on our first very preliminary results from this 
ongoing project. We find that an increase in the short selling on one day predicts 
more negative news about the issuer on the day following. Further exploration of our 
results suggests a number of reasons why this might be so and the regulatory 
implications that f low from our results.
 The first three parts of this article place our inquiry in context. Part I discusses 
what theory suggests are the potential socially beneficial and socially harmful effects 
of short selling. The possibility of negative effects has been sufficiently compelling to 
1. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Report: Rep. Frank Says Uptick Rule Should Be Restored ‘Within a Month’, Economy 
Watch, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/economy-watch/2009/03/report_rep_frank_sayz_uptick_r.
html (Mar. 10, 2009, 12:57 EST) (Rep. Barney Frank pushed for a quick re-implementation of the uptick 
rule to avoid market manipulation through short selling.); Ken Sweet, Morgan’s Mack: Short Sellers 
Destroying our Firm, FOXBusiness, Sept. 17, 2008, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/morgans-
mack-short-sellers-destroying-firm/ (Morgan Stanley CEO John Mack believed current short sellers are 
“irresponsible,” and are “driving [Morgan Stanley] stock down.”); Posting of Shepherd Smith Edwards & 
Kantas to Stockbroker Fraud Blog, U.S. Representative Barney Frank Calls on SEC to Widen Investigation of 
Improper Trading Rumors Surrounding Bear Stearns’s Stock, http://www.stockbrokerfraudblog.com/2008/04/
us_representative_barney_frank.html (Apr. 21, 2008) (Rep. Barney Frank is concerned that short-selling 
in certain banks is being orchestrated to bring stock prices down.).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part I.B.
4. Karl B. Diether, Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, Short-Sale Strategies and Return Predictability, 22 
Rev. Fin. Stud. 575, 579 (2009).
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result in varying kinds of regulation over the last seventy-five years, a brief history of 
which is presented in Part II. Part III provides a survey of the existing empirical 
literature concerning the causes and effects of short selling and the effects of 
regulation. This literature, viewed as a whole, is inconclusive as to any negative social 
effects from short selling and any social gains from its regulation, but there is clearly 
still much to be learned.
 With this background in place, Part IV describes our study of short selling and 
the news. Part V presents and interprets our results, and Part VI concludes with a 
discussion of what we have learned to date and how we hope to proceed.
i. thEOrY
 What does theory suggest about the social consequences of short selling’s effects 
on share prices, capital market efficiency, and corporate governance more generally?
 A. Socially Beneficial Price Effects
 The free availability of short selling can improve share price accuracy in two 
ways. First, it can increase the incentives for sophisticated traders to gather and 
analyze new information relevant to predicting an issuer’s future cash f lows. Second, 
short selling can make prices better reflect already-existing information relevant to 
making such predictions when such information is disparately spread among all the 
potential traders in the market.
  1. Incentives to Gather and Analyze New Information
 The availability of short selling increases the expected return on the hard work of 
gathering new publicly available information and analyzing it to help predict an 
issuer’s future cash f lows.5 These increased incentives arise out of the fact that anyone 
can be a buyer of an issuer’s shares, but, without short selling, only a current holder 
can be a seller.
 There is a fifty-fifty chance that the gathering and analyzing of such information 
turns out to reveal that an issuer’s future cash f low looks better than previously 
thought. In this event, the person can buy shares of the issuer, whether he currently 
holds any shares or not, effectively utilizing the results of his hard work to earn an 
expected profit. He may also benefit from these results by transferring this 
information and analysis to someone else for a profit. While the well-known 
imperfections in the market for information means that there are substantial 
transaction costs involved in obtaining revenues from such a transfer,6 any transferee, 
5. When we refer to information being “publicly available,” we mean anything that is legally observable by 
a member of the public. Thus, for example, a retail chain store analyst who visits an issuer’s stores in 
order to observe how customers are reacting to a new line of merchandise would be collecting publicly 
available information.
6. The dilemma faced by the producer of such information is that she wants to maximize her rents and 
have the information used only as widely as the producer of any valuable input would want it used—i.e., 
to the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The revelation of the information to another 
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whether or not she currently holds any shares of the issuer, can also buy shares and 
hence earn an expected profit based on the transferred information and analysis. 
This means that the market for such transfers is broader than if the usefulness of the 
information were restricted to only those transferees who already owned shares.
 There is also a fifty-fifty chance, however, that the hard work will instead turn 
out to reveal that the issuer’s future cash f lows look worse than previously thought. 
In this event, without short selling, the person who did the hard work can only sell 
shares of the issuer if he currently holds such shares, thereby limiting his sales to the 
number of shares that he holds. Thus, he will either be entirely unable, or limited in 
his ability, to directly use the results of his hard work to earn an expected profit. 
Moreover, it is harder to profit by transferring these results to someone else than 
when the prediction turns out to be better than previously thought. The transaction 
costs of making a transfer are enlarged by the fact that the person who did the hard 
work has to identify, from among all market participants, only those who currently 
hold shares of the issuer. And he must do so without making the results public to the 
world at large, thereby destroying their trading value. Thus, without short selling, 
the rewards for the individual’s hard work if the results turn out to be negative are 
less than the rewards if the results turn out to be positive.
 In contrast, if short selling is freely available, just as anyone can be a buyer, anyone 
can be a seller. If the results generated by the hard work turn out to be negative, the 
rewards for this work are therefore no longer handicapped. If the results turn out to be 
positive, the rewards for this work are just as large as if short selling is prohibited. Since 
the availability of short selling increases the likelihood of profiting if one of the 
outcomes of hard work materializes—negative results—without decreasing the 
likelihood of profiting if the other outcome materializes—positive results—short 
selling increases the overall expected return on performing such work.
 An increase in the expected return on such hard work will increase the amount 
that will be done, resulting in more accurate predictions of future cash f lows, which 
will in turn result in more accurate share prices as such information becomes the 
basis of trades. More accurate share prices enhance efficiency in the economy by 
improving corporate decision making related to the selection of new investment 
projects as well as to the operation of already-existing projects.7
 A possible illustration of the importance of short selling in providing incentives 
for gathering and analyzing information is the reported unhappiness of hedge funds 
undermines her monopoly position because, absent an agreement between the producer and the 
transferee, anyone who receives it can then “produce” additional units of it at very low marginal cost. 
Agreements between the original producer and another to limit the use and further transfer of the 
information are difficult to draft and enforce and thus entail significant transaction costs. Transfers are 
further burdened by the fact that it is hard for the potential transferee to evaluate information without 
learning it, at which point there is no need to pay for it. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the 
Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 616 
(Richard R. Nelson, ed. UMI) (1962).
7. For a more extended discussion of this point and a review of the relevant literature, see Merritt B. Fox 
et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 
337–41 (2003).
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during the summer and fall of 2008 when temporary restrictions were placed on the 
short selling of certain financial firms.8 While these complaints were probably viewed 
by many as an inappropriate desire to further profit from the misery in the financial 
sector,9 the actual picture was more complicated. The efficient market hypothesis 
suggests that even in a crisis such as the one experienced in 2008, there is no more 
reason to believe that at any given moment in time financial institution share prices 
will continue to decrease rather than increase.10 Which direction these prices will go 
depends on new information as it becomes available, and new information is, by 
definition, unpredictable in its implications. Hedge funds and the individuals 
working for them had invested heavily in the capacity, as new information became 
available, to make better predictions concerning the future cash f lows of these issuers 
than the predictions made by others in the market.11 To the extent that the new 
regulations prevented them from engaging in short selling, they were more restricted 
in their ability to earn a return on these investments when their analysis of new 
information turned out to suggest lower future cash f lows than what was suggested 
by previously available information.12
8. See, e.g., The Brief: Institute for Law and Economics, William Ackman Says a Ban on Short Selling is 
Shortsighted, Penn Law J. Online, Spring 2009, http://www.law.upenn.edu/alumni/alumnijournal/
Spring2009/the_brief/page10.html (Ackman believed that the September 2008 ban on short selling is 
misguided and “strait-jacket[s]” hedge fund managers.); James Mackintosh et al., Ban on Shorting Banks 
Failed Badly, Say Experts, FinancialTimes.com, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/34c7e12a- 
0ddd-11de-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1 (Hedge funds and academics believe that the 
short selling restrictions did not work and short selling funds are being “demonized.”). For a discussion 
of these restrictions, see infra Part III.B.3.
9. See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Hedge Funds Alone in Fight Against Short-selling Curb, Investment News, Aug. 
11, 2008, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080811/REG/827522981.
10. Financial economists describe a market displaying “semi-strong” efficiency as one where “prices will 
adjust immediately to public information” after which security returns are unpredictable. Richard A. 
Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 359 (9th ed. 
2008). In such a market, no ordinary investor, on an expected basis, can beat the market by collecting 
and acting on public information because it is already ref lected in price. Id. 
11. See, e.g., James Chanos, President, Kynikos Associates, Prepared Statement for the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Roundtable on Hedge Funds, Panel Discussion: “Hedge Fund Strategies and 
Market Participation,” (May 15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-
chanos.htm; An ‘abomination’? Critics attack SEC’s short-selling ban, L.A. Times, Money & Company 
Blog, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2008/09/some-reaction-t.html (Sept. 19, 2008, 13:07 
PST) (negative reactions of both hedge funds and academics to the ban on short selling); Posting of 
John Hempton, In Defence of Naked Short Selling—Or Why the Crackdown on a Phoney Problem is Costing 
Taxpayers at Least a Billion Dollars, Bronte Capital Blog, http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2009/06/
in-defence-of-naked-short-selling-or.html (June 16, 2009, 23:55 AEST) (arguing that the ban on 
short-selling makes the market less efficient and costs taxpayers money). A less benign explanation of 
the hedge fund unhappiness at the short sale restrictions is that during a financial crisis, short selling 
the shares of financial firms might be profitable because the decline in share price resulting from the 
short sale trade could damage the underlying business of the firm and hence lead to a decline in 
fundamental value that would be ref lected in price longer term. See infra Part I.C.3.
12. Another illustration of the importance of short selling for incentives is the existence of hedge funds that 
specialize in looking for hints that an issuer’s accounting is incorrect and is exaggerating earnings. Such 
funds would be unlikely to exist if short selling were not available because their whole business model is 
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  2. Better Reflection of Disparately Spread Information
 Short selling can also help improve price accuracy by helping prices better reflect 
the implications of information that market participants have already gathered and 
analyzed. Such information is likely to be disparately spread over the range of market 
participants, with some participants possessing some bits of such information and 
other participants possessing other bits.13 Without short selling, an issuer’s share 
price ref lects more fully, or at least more precisely, the views of investors whose 
information sets yield an optimistic assessment of the issuer’s future cash f lows than 
it reflects views of investors whose information sets yield pessimistic assessments.14 
This, again, is due to the fact that while all members of the investment community 
whose information results in an optimistic view can be buyers, for members whose 
information yields a pessimistic view, only those who happen to already hold an 
issuer’s stock can be sellers. The exact way that the lack of short selling undermines 
price accuracy, however, depends on one’s assumptions about investor behavior. An 
assumption that all investors are fully rational yields one conclusion. The contrasting 
assumption that a substantial percentage of investors are “noise traders” who 
irrationally follow fads, fashions, and trends, yields a different conclusion.
 a. Rational-investor model. If one assumes that all investors are fully rational, an 
absence of short selling, combined with the fact that the distribution of information 
among investors makes some investors more optimistic than others, will not bias 
share prices to be on average too high. Participants in the market will know about 
the unavailability of short selling and its implications in terms of the level of trading 
activity by investors with different views. Therefore, the market will consistently 
discount prices to compensate for what would otherwise be an upward bias.15
 Even under this rational-investor model, however, share prices will be less 
accurate without short selling. Imagine that the information sets of those investors 
who have pessimistic views about certain issuers make such investors only mildly 
pessimistic about the issuers’ prospects. In contrast, the information sets of those 
investors who have pessimistic views about the rest of the issuers in the market make 
to look for bad news and to try to profit by selling when they find it. For example, Kynikos Associates is 
described as a “private investment management company . . . . [which] specializes in short selling . . . 
[and] profits in finding fundamentally overvalued securities.” Chanos, supra note 11.
13. In this informal model that treats information as bits, one can imagine that the bits that are relevant to 
a given trader predicting an issuer’s future cash f lows would include not only the bits relating to the 
issuer itself and the input and output markets in which the issuer operates, but also the bits that inform 
the trader’s particular approach to doing analysis. Thus, two persons might have the same set of the first 
type of bits, but come to different predictions concerning the issuer’s future cash f lows, because of 
differences in their sets of the second type of bits. This is a way that one person could be an “optimist,” 
who thinks that the stock is priced below its fundamental value, and another a “pessimist,” who thinks 
it is priced above.
14. For models working out this proposition, see, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, 
Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjustment to Private Information, 18 J. Fin. Econ. 277 (1987); 
Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and the Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. Fin. 1151 (1977).
15. Diamond & Verrecchia, supra note 14, at 278.
651
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
such investors severely pessimistic about these other issuers’ prospects. When there is 
no short selling, the discount imposed on all issuers is an average of the views of the 
mild and the severe pessimists. This is because the market cannot distinguish into 
which of the two groups any given issuer falls; rather the market only knows that the 
pessimist investors’ views concerning the issuer, whether as a group they are mild or 
severe pessimists, are underrepresented in trading.
 If short selling were available, the views of pessimists would instead be fully 
represented in trading. The issuers whose pessimists are only mildly pessimistic 
would have their shares priced higher than the prices that would have resulted from 
the general discount imposed on all issuers in the absence of short selling. Similarly, 
the issuers whose pessimists are severely pessimistic would be priced lower than what 
would have resulted from this general discount. Thus, under the rational-investor 
model, the free availability of short selling would lead to prices that more fully and 
accurately ref lect the stock of information in the world concerning an issuer’s 
prospects. Prices would differentiate between an issuer where a fraction of investors 
possess mildly negative information about the issuer, from an issuer where a fraction 
of investors possess severely negative information about the issuer.
 b. Noise-trader model. Now, instead of full rationality, assume that many investors 
are “noise traders” who irrationally follow fads, fashions, and trends.16 With this 
assumption, different implications arise from the fact that without short selling, 
investors whose information sets give them a pessimistic assessment of an issuer’s future 
cash flows are not as fully represented in trading as investors whose information sets 
give them an optimistic assessment. Unlike the rational-investor model, knowledge by 
some traders of this difference in trading representation will not necessarily lead to 
share prices being adequately discounted in the market. The noise traders, who do not 
consider these trading representation differences in their decisions, are sufficiently 
numerous that their influence on prices is not totally counterbalanced by “smart money” 
arbitragers, who do consider this fact.17 As a result, share prices may be biased upward 
for sustained periods of time. If a bubble begins to form with respect to an issuer, 
persons who trade on the basis of a rational evaluation of future cash flows will all be 
pessimists.18 After these investors sell whatever shares they hold of the issuer, they no 
longer have any influence on its share price.
 Short selling is not necessarily a complete cure to the problems caused by noise 
traders, but if short selling were freely available, the imbalance in how much the 
optimists and the pessimists are represented in trading would cease, and bubbles 
would in turn be more likely to burst before growing too large.19 Under the noise-
16. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, J. Econ. 
Persp., Spring 1990, at 19, 19–20.
17. See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 703 (1990).
18. See Jose A. Schienkman & Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J. Pol. Econ. 1183, 
1185–86 (2003).
19. See Christopher L. Culp & J.B. Heaton, Naked Shorting (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982898; Miller, supra note 14, at 1160–61; Eli Ofek & Matthew 
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trader model, freely available short selling thus enhances share price accuracy because 
bursting bubbles before they become large keeps prices closer on average to their 
fundamental values.
 B. Other Socially Beneficial Effects
 The availability of short selling also greatly facilitates the ability of a dealer to 
provide market-making services. This is because the only alternative way for a dealer 
to provide liquidity in front of heavy selling is to hold a huge inventory, which is very 
expensive.20 As a result of this concern, dealers are usually exempted from any short 
selling restrictions imposed on other traders in the market. Designated dealers have 
become far less important, however, as other traders now provide much of the 
liquidity in the market through the placement of limit orders. The ability of these 
other traders to provide liquidity would be similarly hindered if they were unable to 
short sell. Thus, unlike the early days of NASDAQ ,21 the ability of all traders, not 
just dealers, to short sell freely enhances the amount of liquidity in the market.22
 C. Socially Harmful Price Effects
 The concerns that short selling results in social harms have tended not to be as 
precisely articulated as the claims of short selling’s socially beneficial effects. This is 
most likely due to the fact that negative concerns are more often expressed by 
politicians and corporate executives engaged in ordinary public discourse, rather than 
by financial economists in the more rigorous language of professional academia. 
Behind some of the seemingly exaggerated rhetoric of short selling’s critics, however, 
a number of coherent stories can be told—some potentially more serious than 
others—about situations where the availability of short selling might have socially 
harmful effects.
  1. Pure Manipulation—Depressing Price and Repurchasing
 One story of how the availability of short selling can have socially harmful effects 
involves the use of short selling to profit from manipulation. Under this scenario, the 
manipulator does not believe the stock to be overpriced. She nevertheless sells short 
Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. Fin. 1113, 1113 (2003).
20. See generally Thomas E. Copeland & Dan Galai, Information Effects and the Bid-Ask Spread, 38 J. Fin. 
1457 (1983); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market 
with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 71 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. 
Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J. Fin. 617 (1988); Hans R. Stoll, The Supply of Dealer Services 
in Securities Markets, 33 J. Fin. 1133 (1978).
21. NASDAQ stands for the National Association of Securities and Dealers Automated Quotation. 
NASDAQ , Frequently Asked Questions, http:www.nasdaq.com/help/helpfaq.stm (last visited Feb. 23, 
2010).
22. This negative inf luence has been demonstrated in the case of financial firms. See Ekkehart Boehmer, 
Charles M. Jones & Xiaoyan Zhang, Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008 Shorting Ban (Johnson School 
Research Paper Series No. 34-09, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1412844.
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a substantial block of its shares, perhaps in a series of transactions, knowing that 
these sales in the aggregate will push down the price of the shares. At a subsequent 
time, she will need to repurchase the same number of shares in order to cover. If, 
because the price has been pushed down, she can repurchase these shares at prices 
that on average are less than what she sold them short for, she can profit.23
 Such a manipulation, when successful, has two socially harmful effects. First, on 
average, it moves share prices, at least temporarily, away from their fundamental values 
because the decrease in price is unrelated to any change in information about the future 
cash flows of the issuer involved. Second, it transfers wealth to the class of traders who 
are capable of such transactions from the substantial majority of investors who are not, 
lowering the second group’s expected return from investing and thereby reducing their 
incentives for investing in the market at all. It should be noted, however, that under 
most circumstances, such pure manipulations cannot be expected to yield much profit, 
if any, because the purchase orders needed to effect a cover will push prices up just as 
the sale orders prompted by the original short sale pushed them down.24
  2. Depressing Price in Order to Profit on a Third-Party Contract
 A wide variety of contracts have terms that provide one of the parties with a 
payoff that depends on the market price of an issuer’s shares at a particular point in 
time. For the other party to such a contract, the lower the issuer’s price, the less it 
must pay out under the contract. The party that benefits under the contract from the 
lower price (“low-price beneficiary”) has an incentive to push down the market price 
of the issuer’s shares at the point in time specified in the contract for determining the 
23. This is the alleged tactic employed by participants in the “bear raids” of the early 1930s that so much 
disturbed the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 7 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, 
Securities Regulation 3200 n.213 (3d ed. 2003).
24. The profitability of a pure manipulation trade initiated with a short sale requires that the price response 
to a sell be greater than the price response to a buy, and that this reduced response to a buy will persist 
long enough to accomplish putting on the short position and then covering that position. To understand 
the profit arithmetic of the manipulative trade, suppose that on the bid side of the book, the schedule of 
limit orders is approximated by the linear relation P – b0 – b1Q. That is, this expression describes the last 
(or marginal) price for a sell (short) of Q shares. This implies that the average price is P – b0 – b1Q/2. 
Furthermore, the new spread midpoint moves to P – b1Q as the limit order book responds to the 
information that they believe is in the trade. Lawrence R. Glosten, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order 
Book Inevitable? 49 J. Fin. 1127 (1994). Suppose the limit orders on the ask side of the book, after the 
short position is put on is described by (P – b1Q ) + a0 + a1Q , and a1 < b1. Then, the profit per share from 
a manipulative trade of Q shares is –(b0 + a0) + (b1 – a1)Q/2. For a moderately liquid stock, with a price 
level of 30, the small trade spread component (b0 + a0) will be on the order of .03 per share. A reasonable 
estimate of b1 might be on the order of $.10 per share per 100,000 shares. Suppose that a1 is $.06. Then 
the profit per share for a one million share manipulation is on the order of -.03 + .04*10/2 or $.17 per 
share. This is a total profit of $170,000 on capital of $30,000,000, for a return of 56 basis points. This 
return is over a very short interval of time, but there is probably no expectation that this situation will 
exist on a regular basis. Indeed, sophisticated players in the market may recognize this situation and 
withdraw liquidity from the offer side of the book. Furthermore, this manipulation will only work if 
there are, in fact, no informed buyers in the market waiting to take advantage of the manipulator’s 
manipulation. The conclusion from these calculations is that some manipulations may be profitable, but 
they may not be a consistent source of profit.
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payoff. Just in advance of this point in time, the low-price beneficiary, without any 
belief that the shares are priced above their fundamental value, pushes the price 
down by selling short a substantial block of stock. When she later covers, she may 
end up repurchasing at prices that are on average as great as, or even greater than, the 
prices at which she sold short. She nevertheless may, on a net basis, profit handsomely 
as a result of the gains she experienced from having reduced her payout under the 
contract.
 One harmful social consequence of such behavior is that, like the use of short 
selling for pure manipulation, it moves share prices away from their fundamental 
values. But this harm too is likely to be limited. The deviation would likely last only 
a very brief period of time, because the contract beneficiary would want to cover as 
quickly as possible in order to minimize risk. The social harm from such a brief 
deviation in price would normally not be great because the mechanisms that depend 
on price accuracy to enhance efficiency in the real economy are not sufficiently fast 
acting to be seriously affected.
 A second harmful consequence of such behavior is the expenditure of social 
resources by the other party to the contract to defend against the possibility that she 
is disadvantaged under the contract by the low-price beneficiary short selling just in 
advance of the time specified for the payoff. One way the other party may be able to 
defend herself is to insist at the time of contracting on more complicated contractual 
terms that would prevent being disadvantaged by such short selling. More complicated 
contractual terms in turn require the parties to devote more time and effort to 
negotiation and drafting.25 A third, related problem is that such defenses may be 
ineffective or too costly to be worthwhile and a useful kind of contractual term is 
simply not used as frequently as would be desirable because of its potential to be 
undermined by short selling.
 These problems, though real, are again probably not serious enough to justify 
general regulation against short selling, even if short selling had no beneficial effects. 
The resources consumed and inefficiencies created as a result of these problems are 
probably not very great relative to the enforcement costs of any kind of regime that 
effectively would prevent short selling.
  3. Diminishing the Underlying Value of the Firm
 According to the analysis above, it is difficult, on an expected basis, to buy back for 
a profit shares that have been sold short. Thus, attempts at pure manipulation are not 
on average likely to make much money, if any. But this analysis assumes that the 
underlying value of the firm is unchanged by the initial drop in price caused by the 
short seller’s sell orders. This is a reasonable assumption for most firms—the operations 
25. The terms, for example, might include some kind of verifiable prohibition against short selling by the 
low-price beneficiary around the time of the trigger point. Another defense would be for the other party 
to make her own intervention in the market—purchasing shares just in advance of the time specified for 
determination of the payoff in order to counter the price-diminishing impact of any short sales by the 
low-price beneficiary.
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of their underlying businesses, and hence the cash flows generated by their operations, 
are largely unaffected by short-term changes in the price of their shares.
 However, the operations of some kinds of firms, especially at certain times, may 
be significantly affected by such short-term share price changes. A financial firm 
during a time of a financial crisis is the most likely example. Such a firm’s ability to 
perform its day-to-day underlying businesses—lending, trading, and underwriting—
depends on its ability to maintain its capital base. As we have seen recently, this base 
can erode rapidly in a financial crisis and the lost capital can only be replaced with 
new sales of equity. When there has been such erosion in an issuer’s capital base, if 
the price of its equity is temporarily depressed, the financial firm either has to forego 
business or dilute equity. Thus, its future cash f lows per share, and hence its 
fundamental value, can be reduced by a temporary drop in share price.26
 Consider a trader during a crisis who thinks that the decline that has already 
occurred in the share price of a given financial firm is sufficient to reflect the new 
realities brought on by the crisis and so she does not believe that these shares are 
overpriced. The trader nevertheless sells short a substantial block of the firm’s shares. 
The initial share-price drop caused by her short sale may become a self-confirming 
hypothesis in the sense that the share-price drop may lead to a drop in the share’s 
fundamental value because of the damage of the lower share price to the firm’s 
underlying business. Moreover, because of this self-confirming aspect, short selling 
the issuer’s shares could easily become contagious. Short sales in such a situation 
could be profitable on an expected basis because, reflecting the decline in fundamental 
value caused by the contagious short-selling-induced share-price drop, the price at 
which the short sellers cover would be lower on average than the short sale price. 
Fear that this sort of phenomenon was underway at points during the summer and 
fall of 2008 appears to underlie the thinking that led to the imposition of greater 
restrictions on short selling of shares in U.S. financial firms during this period.27 
Even a financial firm is not seriously vulnerable to this kind of problem most of the 
time, however. Absent a financial crisis eroding its capital basis, it too can, without 
26. This is very different from a manufacturing firm, which, if it suffers a temporary decline in share price 
unrelated to its fundamentals can, without great damage to its future cash f lows per share, either 
temporarily defer real investments or raise funds for the real investment in ways other than equity sales.
27. See infra Part II.B.3. On September 18, 2008 the SEC instituted a temporary emergency ban on the 
shorting of 799 financial services companies because of “[concern] about recent sudden declines in the 
prices of a wide range of securities . . . [which] can give rise to questions about the underlying financial 
condition of an issuer, which in turn can create a crisis of confidence without a fundamental underlying 
basis.” Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-58592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 18, 2008). The following day, the SEC reiterated 
its belief that “unbridled short selling is contributing to the recent, sudden price declines in the securities 
of financial institutions unrelated to true price valuation. Financial institutions are particularly 
vulnerable to this crisis of confidence and panic selling,” and further stated that in addition to the new 
shorting ban and the previous emergency orders increasing short sale reporting and easing restrictions 
on issuer repurchase, it “may consider additional steps as necessary to protect the integrity and quality of 
the securities markets and strengthen investor confidence.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets, SEC Release 2008-211 
(Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm.
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much damage, wait out a temporary dip in share price before selling new equity. 
Thus, this kind of social harm from short selling, if it occurs at all, is probably an 
exceptional event and at most would only call for temporary restrictions on short 
selling that are limited to the shares of firms in a single sector.
  4. Short Selling Combined with the Creation of False News
 Two potentially profitable strategies can be based on combining short selling with 
the spreading of false news. One would be to short sell first, next spread false negative 
news that depresses prices, and finally cover at the depressed price. The other is to first 
spread false positive news that increases share price, next short sell at the inflated price, 
and finally cover after the market realizes the falsity of the news and the price inflation 
has dissipated. Both strategies are prohibited by SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated under 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).28
 This more general fraudulent practice of spreading false news and trading to take 
advantage of the resulting distortion in price, in whatever form undertaken, has a 
number of harmful social effects. Two of these resemble the harmful effects of a 
successful pure manipulation. Like a pure manipulation, the spreading of false news 
motivated by the prospect of profiting from the distortion in price will move share 
prices temporarily away from their fundamental values and thus reduce, at least a bit, 
the overall level of share price accuracy and the benefits that accurate prices yield for 
the efficient operation of the real economy. Also, like a successful pure manipulation, 
the fraudulent practice of spreading false news and trading to take advantage of the 
resulting distortion in price transfers wealth away from the substantial majority of 
investors to the class of traders who are capable of implementing the fraud. This 
lowers the first group’s expected return from investing and reduces their incentives 
for investing in the market at all.
 This more general fraudulent practice of trading on the distortion created by 
false news can lead to additional social harms as well. First, because the trader 
spreading the false news knows the news is false and the other party to the transaction 
does not, the fraud results in an information asymmetry between the trader and 
other parties to his trade. The prospect of possibly entering unknowingly into a trade 
with a trader undertaking such a fraud will lead market makers to increase their bid/
ask spreads.29 An increased bid/ask spread in turn reduces liquidity, which results in 
28. Deliberately spreading false news and trading to take advantage of the resulting distortion in price 
violates the Rule 10b-5 prohibition against the making of “any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). Recently, the SEC 
has reaffirmed its commitment to “vigorously investigate and prosecute those who manipulate markets 
with this witch’s brew of damaging rumors and short sales.” Michael J. de la Merced, S.E.C. Accuses 
Trader of Spreading Rumors, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2008, at C6. This has led to charges such as those 
filed in the SDNY against trader Paul S. Berliner for shorting in connection with rumor-mongering. 
Complaint, SEC v. Paul S. Berliner, No. 08-CV-3859 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008) available at http://
www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20537.pdf (case settled in Administration Proceeding 
File No. 3-13035).
29. Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 20; see also Larry Harris, Trading & Exchanges: Market 
Microstructure For Practitioners 289–91, 299–302 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
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parties inefficiently foregoing secondary market trades that they would otherwise 
find worthwhile to undertake. The increased bid/ask spread also makes engaging in 
trading based on the gathering and analyzing of fundamental information more 
expensive and, by reducing the profitability of such trading, reduces the level of such 
information gathering and analysis and hence share price accuracy.30 Also, the more 
false news that is spread, the more real resources investors will expend in the effort 
to detect whether any particular piece of news is true or false (i.e., the greater the 
precaution costs).
 The fraudulent practice of spreading false news and trading to take advantage of 
the resulting distortion is therefore clearly socially harmful. The relevant question 
for this study, however, is whether the availability of short selling significantly 
increases the level of this harmful practice. Arguably it will not, because there are 
alternative ways of profiting from spreading both negative and positive news without 
the use of short sales. The alternative strategy for profiting from spreading false 
negative news is to spread the news first, next purchase the shares at the resulting 
depressed price, and then resell the shares after the market realizes the falsity of the 
news and the depression in price dissipates. Another alternative strategy for profiting 
from spreading false positive news is to purchase the shares before spreading the 
news and then sell immediately after the news has been spread at the resulting 
inflated price.
 A more sophisticated approach to the question, though, suggests that this 
argument is f lawed and that the availability of short selling does increase the level of 
the fraudulent practice of spreading false news and trading to take advantage of the 
distortion in price. Understanding this more sophisticated approach starts with two 
observations. The first observation is that for some kinds of information, at least 
some of the time, convincingly spreading false negative information may be easier 
than convincingly spreading false positive information, and that for some other kinds 
of information the opposite may be the case.
 For example, positive false news is sometimes easier to spread because it is 
probably less likely to be immediately corrected by the company. During rising times, 
false positive news may also be more believable because people want to believe it and 
it is consistent with the overall mood of euphoria. On the other hand, where avoiding 
specificity is desirable, false negative information, because of the power of innuendo, 
is probably easier to spread than false positive information.31
30. This is the same negative effect as is caused by trading on the basis of confidential information from 
inside the firm. See Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of 
Stock Prices, 23 Rand J. Econ. 106, 110 (1992); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider 
Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1238–43 (2001).
31. At the start of the financial crisis in the summer of 2008, the SEC, for example, appeared more 
concerned with the ease with which false negative rumors were spread than false positive ones. It 
justified the emergency imposition of new rules relating to the borrowing and delivery requirements on 
short sales of financial institution shares, in part, on concern that negative false rumors concerning 
them had fueled share price decline below the level that would have resulted from the normal price 
discovery process. Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, 
Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,379, paras. 1–2 (July 15, 2008).
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 The second observation is that the legal and financial risks associated with the 
fraud of spreading false news and trading to take advantage of the resulting distortion 
in price may, under some circumstances, be less when the initial trade is made in 
advance of spreading false information and the second transaction is made 
immediately after the false news has had its full impact on price.32 And, under other 
circumstances, the fraud may be harder to detect or less risky financially when the 
initial trade is made after the false information has been spread but is still distorting 
the price, and the reverse trade is made after the market realizes the truth and the 
price distortion dissipates.33
32. The legal risk associated with a trader engaging in this fraudulent practice is the risk of detection and 
hence of a legally imposed sanction. The financial risk is the variability in the possible return from 
engaging in this fraudulent practice and the effect of this variability on the overall level of riskiness of 
the trader’s portfolio. Engaging in the practice un-diversifies the trader’s portfolio, which in turn makes 
the riskiness of the trader’s portfolio sensitive to the variability in the return from engaging in the 
fraudulent practice even though this variability represents idiosyncratic risk.
33. As for legal risk, on the one hand, engaging in the initial trade after, rather than before, spreading false 
news may be harder to detect because significant news tends to increase the overall volume of trading. 
Paul C. Tetlock, Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market 62 J. Fin. 
1139 (2007). On the other hand, where the false news to be spread is positive, detection of the fraud 
may be more difficult if the initial trade is before the spreading of the news because it avoids needing to 
engage in a short sale to profit. Short sales are more conspicuous because they represent a smaller 
percentage of trades.
  As for financial risk, where the initial trade occurs first and the spreading of the false news occurs 
thereafter, the primary source of the variability in the possible return from engaging in the fraud stems 
from the inability of the trader, at the time she engages in the initial transaction, to predict precisely the 
extent, if any, to which the false news will affect price. The second source of variability is all the other 
factors that will push the issuer’s price around during the period between the first transaction and the 
second transaction. The importance of this source of risk is limited by the fact that the time between the 
fraud’s first and second transaction is likely to be short, probably no more than a day or two. This is 
because the trader will presumably spread the false news as soon as the initial transaction is completed. 
For a stock trading in a market that is efficient with respect to public announcements of the issuer, even 
news that is publicly disseminated by a non-issuer source, for example a news service or an analyst, and 
that has as its ultimate source a publicly unnamed person (the trader spreading the false news), is likely 
to have its full impact on price very quickly. Once the false news has had its full impact on price, the 
trader will immediately want to engage in the second transaction in order to eliminate any further risk 
and lock in her profits.
  Where the spreading of the false news occurs first and the initial trade occurs thereafter the 
relative importance of these two sources’ f inancial risk are reversed. The primary source of this 
variability in the possible return stems from all the other factors that will push the issuer’s price around 
during the period between the fraudulent first transaction and the second transaction. This is because 
there may well be an extended period of time before the market totally realizes the falsity of the news 
and the impact of this news on price dissipates. Since the trader cannot make her full return from 
engaging in the practice until the impact on price completely dissipates, the trader remains undiversified 
for a considerable period of time and cannot lock in her profits. The other source of variability—the 
inability of the trader, at the time she engages in the initial transaction, to ascertain precisely the extent 
that the false news has affected prices—is now the less important source of risk. Compared to the 
scenario where the initial transaction precedes the spreading of the false news, the trader in this scenario 
has the advantage of being able to observe the price change before she commits by engaging in the first 
transaction. Because other factors may affect price at the same time as the false news is being spread, it 
may not be possible to ascertain perfectly the impact of the false news on price. Still, for assessing this 
impact, being able to observe the price change is a big advantage over not being able to observe it.
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 These two observations suggest a variety of possible combinations of the relevant 
factors. For situations representing many of these combinations, the more 
advantageous way of undertaking the fraud involves the use of a short sale. In at least 
some of these situations, if short selling were not available, the fraud would no longer 
be attractive enough to be worthwhile. Thus, the availability of short selling would 
increase the prevalence of fraud involving the spreading of false news and its 
associated social harms. Indeed, compared to the three other kinds of practices 
involving short selling discussed here—pure manipulation, depressing price to profit 
from a contract with a third party, and profiting from the diminished underlying 
value that results from the short sales’ initial depression of prices—theory would 
suggest that using short selling to profit from spreading false news may have the 
most consistent potential for having significant harmful social effects, though it is 
possible to argue otherwise. Thus, such activity definitely seems worthy of empirical 
investigation.
 D. Short Selling on the Basis of Negative Inside Information and Its Effects
 One other practice—trading on the basis of negative inside information—will 
also likely be more prevalent if short selling is available because ownership of an 
issuer’s shares will not be necessary to take advantage of any such information that a 
trader might come to possess. The trader can simply sell short and then cover when 
the price declines after the information becomes public. Trading on the basis of 
negative inside information has three of the same socially harmful effects as spreading 
false news and trading to take advantage of the resulting distortion in price: (i) 
transferring wealth to those able to engage in the practice, thereby discouraging 
participation in the market by those who cannot; (ii) raising the bid/ask spread with 
the accompanying efficiency-reducing decrease in market liquidity and share-price-
accuracy-inducing trading based on fundamental analysis; and (iii) adding to the 
level of real resources devoted to precaution costs. However, unlike spreading false 
news, which has no redeeming virtues, trading on negative inside information, 
though illegal under many circumstances, has countervailing social benefits because, 
at the time it is undertaken, it moves an issuer’s share price toward—rather than 
away from—its fundamental value. As a result, the increase in this practice that 
results from the availability of short selling, depending in part on its prevalence 
relative to the practice of spreading false news combined with trading, may on 
balance have less negative social consequences.
ii. histOrY Of rEgULatiOn
 Since the onset of the Great Depression, the perception that short selling can be 
socially harmful has led to a variety of kinds of regulation.34
34. More detailed histories of U.S. short selling regulation can be found at Charles M. Jones, Shorting 
Restrictions: Revisiting the 1930s, October 2008, http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/whoswho/getpub.
cfm?pub=3233; Amendments to Regulation SHO, SEC Release No. 34-59748, 17 C.F.R. pt. 242, at 
11–17 (Apr. 10, 2009).
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 A. The Depression and Establishment of a Regulatory Structure
 In September 1931, the NYSE brief ly banned short selling altogether.35 Soon 
after the lapse of this ban, the NYSE began to prohibit short sales at a price below 
the price of the immediately preceding last sale and to regulate the lending of shares.36 
Also, while financial theorists today are skeptical that pure manipulations can be 
expected to yield significant profits, the legislative hearings and investigations 
leading up to the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the 
Exchange Act led many persons to believe that a substantial cause of the enormous 
drop in share prices beginning in the latter part of 1929 was the practice of bear 
raids—a group of traders selling short a large amount of an issuer’s securities with 
the hope that they can profit by covering through repurchases at the depressed price 
resulting from their sell orders.37 As a result, when the Exchange Act was passed in 
1934, it included section 10(a), which prohibits short sales in violation of any rule 
promulgated by the SEC in furtherance of the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.38
 The SEC did not utilize its authority under section 10(a) immediately. But shortly 
after the market break of 1937, when officials believed concentrated short selling to 
have occurred, the SEC adopted Rule 10a-1, which imposed, subject to certain 
exceptions, the “uptick” test on short sales of exchange-listed securities. This test 
allowed short sales only if they were either at a price above the price of the last 
reported sale, or at a price equal to the last reported sale (where the last reported sale 
was above the price of the reported sale immediately preceding it).39 Eventually, with 
a several-decade delay, the more heavily traded NASDAQ securities were also subject 
to similar regulations, but with a test based on the most recent best bids rather than 
reported sale prices.40
35. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 34, at 1.
36. See id; see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report of the Special Study of the Securities 
Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 88-95 Part 2, 
at 251 (1963) (sixteen exchanges adopted this rule in 1935).
37. See Loss & Seligman, supra note 23, at 3200 n.213.
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
39. Jones, supra note 34, at 20; see also Exchange Act Release No. 1548, 1938 WL 32911 (Jan. 24, 1938).
40. Originally adopted in 1994, NASD Rule 3550 (renumbered as Rule 5100 by SR-NASD-2005-087 
effective Aug. 1, 2006) regulated short selling to allow short sales only when the current bid is equal to 
or greater than the current inside bid. Like the tick test, the bid test was developed in an attempt to 
stabilize the market by precluding shorts when prices are declining. The bid test allows more sales than 
the tick test, however, because “only the bid (rather than the actual price) must be rising for a short sale 
to be allowed.” Nasdaq Securities Can Use Flexible Short Sale Rules, Fin. Srvs. Advisory Update (White 
& Case LLP, New York, N.Y.), Aug. 2006, at 2, available at http://www.whitecase.com/publications/
detail.aspx?publication=993.
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 B. Recent Developments
 Notwithstanding these restrictions, the extent of short selling grew substantially,41 
as did theoretical and empirical understanding of its social effects, resulting in a 
number of changes in SEC policy in recent years.
  1. The Rule 202T Test Suspension of Regulations
 In 2004, in the midst of a five-year period of strongly increasing stock prices,42 
the SEC adopted Rule 202T of Regulation SHO, which established procedures for 
the SEC to suspend its short sale restrictions for a test set of issuers in order to 
perform a study comparing their pricing with issuers that continued to be subject to 
the restrictions.43 The test period ultimately ran from May 2, 2005 through August 
6, 2007. Essentially, one-third of the three thousand issuers composing the Russell 
3000 Index were selected at random to be the test group for whom restrictions were 
suspended, with the remaining two-thirds serving as a control group.
  2. Evaluation of the Test Results and Elimination of Restrictions
 The SEC had the staff at its Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA”) analyze the 
data collected in connection with the test and made this data available to outside 
researchers as well. A recent SEC Release, looking back to the time following the 
conclusion of the test, states that “OEA found little empirical justification at that 
time for maintaining short sale price restrictions, especially for actively traded 
securities.”44 The Release goes on to say that this analysis, combined with the studies 
of outside researchers, “generally . . . supported removal of short sale price test 
restrictions at that time.”45 Ref lecting these findings, the SEC eliminated all 
restrictions on short selling effective July 3, 2007.46
  3. The Financial Crisis Reversal
 The sharp drop and high volatility displayed by market prices in the summer and 
fall of 2008, however, led the SEC to reverse course. It issued two temporary 
emergency orders relating to the short selling of financial issuer stocks—the first, in 
41. Holger Daske, Scott A. Richardson & Irem Tuna, Do Short Sale Transactions Precede Bad News Events? 
(The Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa. 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=722242.
42. Four of the five years in the period 2003–2007 showed substantial growth in the Dow Jones Index and 
the decline in the year without growth, 2005, was a modest .61%. The average annual growth during 
this five-year period was 10.12%. 1Stock1.com, Dow Jones Industrial Average Yearly Returns, http://
www.1stock1.com/1stock1_139.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
43. Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. § 242.202T (2004).
44. Amendments to Regulation SHO, supra note 34, at 13.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55970, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (July 3, 
2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242).
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July 2008, reinforced rules relating to the borrowing and delivery of shares,47 and the 
second, in September 2008, prohibited, for a two-week period, all short selling of 
the shares of about 800 financial issuers.48 In April 2009, after continued trouble in 
the markets, the SEC proposed for comment the imposition of some new form of 
short sale price test or circuit breaker.49 In its release making these proposals, the 
SEC stated, “we are not aware of specific empirical evidence that the elimination of 
short sale price tests has contributed to the increased volatility in U.S. markets.”50 It 
suggested, however, that many members of the public believe that there is a 
connection,51 and that the resulting deterioration in investor confidence made 
proposing these reforms appropriate.52
iii. EMpiriCaL rEsEarCh
 What does the empirical research to date tell us about the theories relating to the 
possible social benefits and harms caused by short selling and the effects of the 
various regulatory interventions over the last seventy-five years? Until recently, this 
research was hampered by the fact that the only available data with respect to each 
issuer was its market’s monthly statement of the level of short interest as of mid-
month—i.e., the proportion of the issuer’s outstanding shares that, as of that date, 
had been sold short and not yet been covered.53 Recent research, however, has taken 
advantage of newly available daily data concerning short selling activity—the number 
of shares of an issuer sold in a day that are marked “short,” which is the data used in 
our study as well. There is also recent research using detailed new data from the 
1930s relating to regulatory events in that period.
 A. Research Seeking to Explain Monthly Short Interest
 The level of monthly short interest in an issuer’s shares has been found to be 
positively related to a number of factors: (i) negative abnormal returns in the following 
month,54 (ii) high share prices relative to a variety of measures associated with 
47. Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-58166, 73 Fed. Reg. 42,349 (July 15, 2008).
48. Emergency Order Taking Temporary Action to Respond to Market Developments, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-58592, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,169 (Sept. 18, 2008).
49. Jones, supra note 34, at 1.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 25.
53. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes to Increase the Frequency of the Short Interest Reporting 
Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 34-55406, 72 Fed. Reg. 11,071 (Mar. 6, 2007). FINRA Rule 
4560, previous NASD Rule 3360 and Consolidated NYSE Rules 421(2) and 421.10, now require semi-
monthly reporting, but, prior to September 7, 2007, reporting under these rules was only required on a 
monthly basis. 
54. Paul Asquith, Parag A. Pathak & Jay R. Ritter, Short Interest and Stock Returns (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. W10434, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=532993; Hemang 
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fundamental value,55 (iii) subsequent downward analyst revisions,56 and (iv) subsequent 
negative earnings surprises.57 These results suggest that, at least before accounting 
for transaction costs associated with short selling, short sellers can earn abnormal 
profits. These profits could be based on superior analysis and hence be consistent 
with the view that the practice has the socially beneficial effect of helping make 
share prices more accurate by adding to the incentives to gather and analyze 
information and the incorporation of the resulting conclusions into share price. More 
problematically, however, such profits could be based on inside information or they 
could be the product of the clearly socially harmful practice of spreading false news, 
which would be more directly related to our project.
 B. Research Concerning the Effects of Short Selling Restrictions on Share-Price Levels
 Determining the effect of short selling restrictions on the level of share prices of 
the issuers involved is important for sorting out the various theories discussed above 
concerning short selling’s social effects, both positive and negative. One theory, 
relating to how short selling helps prices better reflect disparately spread information, 
suggests that restrictions on short selling bias prices upward to a level above their 
fundamental value.58 A second theory, also relating to how short selling helps prices 
better reflect disparately spread information, suggests that restrictions would make 
prices less accurate but would not consistently bias them one way or the other.59 A 
third theory, relating to how short selling can be used by traders to engage in pure 
manipulation, implies that restrictions would inhibit a practice that, at least 
temporarily, biases prices downward.60
 The empirical literature on the effect of short selling restrictions on share price 
levels is mixed in its conclusions. A study by Charles Jones, concerning various 
restrictions imposed in the 1930s, concludes that the respective impositions of 
restrictions were associated with a positive share-price reaction.61 This result is 
consistent with the first theory—that restrictions, by diminishing the influence of 
investors holding negative information, bias prices above their fundamental level—
and the third theory—that the lack of restrictions, by making purely manipulative 
Desai at al., An Investigation of the Information Role of Short Interest in the Nasdaq Market, 57 J. Fin. 2263 
(2002).
55. Patricia M. Dechow et al., Short-sellers, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock Returns, 61 J. Fin. Econ. 77 
(2001).
56. Jennifer Francis et al., Do Short Sellers Convey Information About Changes in Fundamentals or Risk? 
(Working Paper, on f ile with the Fuqua Sch. of Bus., 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=815668.
57. Id.
58. See supra Part I.A.2.b.
59. See supra Part I.A.2.a.
60. See supra Part I.C.1.
61. Jones, supra note 34.
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bear raids easier, biases prices below their fundamental level. But it is not consistent 
with the second theory—that restrictions do not consistently bias prices one way or 
the other, they just make them less accurate. The fact that the price reaction to each 
restriction occurred at the time that the rule became effective, rather than at the 
time it was announced, is also inconsistent with the rational expectations assumption 
behind the second theory.
 On the other hand, a study of much more recent trading by Diether, Lee, and 
Werner comes to a different conclusion.62 This study analyzed data concerning the 
daily level of shorting activity and price behavior of issuers that composed the 
approximately 1000 issuers in the SEC’s Rule 202T test group, for which, during the 
test period of May 2005 through August 2007, all short sale restrictions were 
eliminated, and compared it with the same data for the approximately 2000 issuers in 
the control group, on which the existing restrictions continued to be imposed.63 The 
authors found that the level of shorting activity for the test group increased relative 
to the control group, but that daily returns and volatility were essentially the same 
for each group.64 The test group’s relative increase in shorting activity suggests that 
the restrictions were having a real effect on behavior. The lack of a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups in terms of returns is consistent with 
the second theory’s implication that restrictions on short selling, though reducing 
price accuracy, will not bias prices, but is unsupportive of the first and third theories. 
The lack of a statistically significant difference with respect to volatility has 
ambiguous implications in terms of support for the second theory, because no 
consensus exists among financial economists concerning the relationship between 
volatility and share price accuracy.65
 C. Studies Relating Daily Shorting Activity to Abnormal Returns
 A substantial portion of short sales are covered in a matter of days.66 Studies of the 
relationship between short interest in the middle of one month and returns in the next 
month are thus likely to miss much of what animates such short sales and their effects. 
Recently available data concerning daily short sale activity, which we use in our study, 
provides a window into this matter. This data is based upon the proportion of an 
62. Karl B. Diether, Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, It’s SHO Time! Short-Sale Price Tests and Market 
Quality, 64 J. Fin. 37 (2009).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 38–40.
65. Compare Kenneth D. West, Dividend Innovations and Stock Price Volatility, 56 Econometrica 37 (1988) 
(The lower the volatility as measured by the variance (“SSE”) of the portion of an issuer’s daily share 
price change not explained by the day’s return on the market as a whole, the more accurate the issuer’s 
share price), and Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging 
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements? 58 J. Fin. Econ. 215 (2000) (The higher the SSE 
relative to the variance of the issuer’s total daily share price change, the more accurate the issuer’s share 
price.). For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, 
and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 350–57 (2003).
66. Diether, Lee & Werner, supra note 4, at 578–79.
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issuer’s daily sales that are marked “short,” as is required of brokers executing a short 
sale.67 Before the discussion of our study, in Parts IV and V, we review here the existing 
studies using such data. This review will help in the interpretation of our results.
  1. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel—Short Sales Preceding Earnings Announcements
 Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (“CFA”) examined daily short trading activity of the 
more established NASDAQ issuers from September 13, 2000 to December 12, 2000, 
and related this level of activity to the timing of issuer earnings announcements.68
 a. Findings. CFA found that the level of short activity in the five days preceding 
an earnings announcement is different from the level at other times.69 The level is 
unusually low in advance of positive earnings surprises and unusually high in advance 
of negative earnings surprises.70 Moreover, the level of short selling is inversely 
related to the post-announcement price reaction,71 and so the extent of the deviation 
in each direction from the normal level of short selling was found to be related to the 
extent of the earnings surprise. CFA concluded that these results are “consistent with 
the existence of informed traders engaging in abnormally large short selling as they 
anticipate a negative earnings surprise and a corresponding decline in share price.”72
 CFA made the additional determination that during trading days outside this 
brief window before an earnings announcement, there is an above-average level of 
short selling for shares of issuers with characteristics that, according to some parts of 
the finance literature, are more likely to have what, to the market, turns out to be a 
negative surprise concerning earnings. However, CFA found that these issuers still 
had an increase in short selling activity during this brief window relative to their 
already-elevated level at other times. On the basis of this additional determination, 
they concluded that “pre-announcement behavior is more likely to be driven by 
information specific to the upcoming announcements of the individual firms,”73 
presumably in contrast to gathering and analyzing publicly available data in order to 
detect a deviation between price and fundamental value. Such specific information 
about upcoming announcements is, of course, confidential and can only come, 
directly or indirectly, from persons inside the firm.
 b. Interpretation: The importance of short selling based on inside confidential information. 
Even absent this additional determination, CFA’s conclusion that inside information 
motivated the observed short selling increase during this brief period in advance of 
67. See Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2009).
68. Stephen E. Christophe, Michael G. Ferri & James J. Angel, Short Selling Prior to Earnings Announcements, 
59 J. Fin. 1845 (2004).
69. Id. at 1845.
70. Id. at 1846.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1873.
73. Id. at 1846.
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earnings announcements with negative surprises makes sense on its face. Because 
new events relevant to predicting an issuer’s future cash f lows are occurring all the 
time, a deviation between price and fundamental value—the development that 
creates a profitable opportunity for gathering and analyzing publicly available 
information and trading on the conclusion—can occur at any time. Thus, there is no 
reason to believe that the expected return—and hence the level of short selling 
activity—from gathering and analyzing publicly available information would be 
sharply higher during the few days immediately preceding a quarterly earnings 
announcement than during all the other trading days of the quarter.
 The findings that shorting activity is lower than normal in advance of a positive 
earnings surprise, and that the more positive the surprise, the lower the level of short 
selling, have additional implications not explored by CFA. Namely, if short selling is 
lower than normal immediately in advance of a positive earnings surprise, the deficit 
has to come from the absence of short sales by members of the class of persons who, 
during all the other trading days of the quarter, would have sold the issuer’s shares 
short but who do not do so because they have information concerning the 
announcement.
 CFA’s finding thus suggests something about the proportion of persons that 
make trading decisions based on inside confidential information out of the larger 
group of all persons who are regularly engaging in short selling. This proportion is 
large enough that at the moments when we would expect such traders to be 
particularly likely to possess material inside information—just before announcements 
of positive earnings surprises—we can observe a dip in short selling that is large 
enough to be statistically significant, despite the background noise from changes in 
level of short selling activity by the traders in the market who are not trading on the 
basis of inside information. This finding is all the more interesting because a person 
who has access a few days in advance to inside information about an issuer’s positive 
earnings announcement is likely to be a person who is also able, at times other than 
immediately in advance of an earnings announcement, to obtain nonpublic inside 
information about earnings and other matters relevant to predicting an issuer’s future 
cash f lows. The CFA finding thus suggests that a significant portion of short selling 
at all times of the year, not just in advance of quarterly earnings announcements, is 
motivated by inside information.
  2. Deither, Lee, and Werner—Short Sales Preceding Abnormal Returns
 Deither, Lee, and Werner (“DLW”) examined daily short trading activity in 
3854 NYSE and NASDAQ listed issuers from January 2, 2005 until December 30, 
2005, and related it to the timing of issuers’ abnormal returns.74
 a. Findings. DLW’s first finding relates to short selling activity in advance of 
daily price changes in an issuer’s shares that represent abnormal returns. They found 
74. See Diether, Lee & Werner, supra note 4.
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that short selling activity increases in the five days preceding negative abnormal 
returns.75
 b. Likely explanations. There are three kinds of short selling that in the aggregate 
most likely explain DLW’s finding: (i) traders selling short on inside information 
concerning an upcoming issuer announcement, (ii) traders who spread false negative 
information about an issuer and then short sell, and (iii) traders who spread true 
negative information about an issuer and then short sell.
  i. Near-announcement inside-information short sellers. Consider a trader (a 
“near-announcement inside-information short seller”) who obtains confidential 
information, directly or indirectly from inside an issuer, that the issuer is about to 
announce significantly negative news. The trader seeks to profit from this information 
by selling the issuer’s shares short. Immediately after the public announcement of the 
bad news, the issuer’s share price will often decline sufficiently to represent an 
abnormal negative return. This trader cannot sell on the basis of the inside information 
until she receives it, which, by our definition, is only a few days before the 
announcement. The short sales of this trader would elevate the aggregate level of 
short selling in the issuer’s shares above what it otherwise would be. Because, in an 
efficient market, the announcement of bad news would have an immediate negative 
share price effect that would often represent an abnormal negative return, the 
existence of such traders would help explain the DLW finding of an elevated level of 
short selling during the five days preceding a negative abnormal return. As noted 
earlier, their behavior is in many instances illegal and, in the view of most 
commentators today, socially harmful.76
 For a number of reasons, a significant portion of all the short selling based on 
confidential information from inside an issuer that is relevant to predicting a future 
negative announcement is likely to occur within the five days preceding the 
announcement. To start, a message containing this information is less risky to trade 
on when it is received soon before the predicted announcement. The message on its 
face is likely to be a higher probability prediction that the announcement will in fact 
occur. Also, the prediction will be more credible because the person delivering the 
message has the reputational concern that it will be subject to rapid and unambiguous 
confirmation or refutation. For the same reasons, the message is more likely to spread 
easily among traders. This spread is further aided by the fact that the message is 
likely to be more discrete and specific than information that suggests the implications 
of a possible announcement some time further in the future. The broader the spread 
of the message, the more it likely will add to the volume of short sales.
 One prominent kind of bad news announced by an issuer that is likely to be 
followed by an abnormal negative return is, of course, a negative earnings surprise. 
Thus, the near-announcement inside-information short selling explanation of DLW’s 
75. Id. at 576–77.
76. See supra Part I.D.
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finding is consistent with the inside-information explanation of the CFA results 
provided above.
  ii. False-news-spreading short sellers. The universe of events studied in the 
DLW study—abnormal negative returns—is much broader than the issuer-announced 
earnings surprises studied by CFA. As a result, the range of possible explanations is 
expanded as well. One additional possible explanation is that traders who short sell 
soon thereafter spread false negative news in some way that seems credible to a 
sufficient number of traders to bring the price down, and then cover at the depressed 
price. We will refer to such traders as “false-news-spreading short sellers.” These 
traders would be anxious to time their short sales and the spreading of the false news 
close together, so as to cover at the depressed prices as quickly as possible and thereby 
minimize their risk and lock in their profits. Thus, when the tactic is sufficiently 
successful, an abnormal negative return would be expected to be observed within a 
few days of the elevation in short sales caused by such traders, which is consistent 
with the DLW finding. As noted earlier, this behavior is illegal and unambiguously 
socially harmful.77
  iii. Fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short sellers. A third possible 
explanation of DLW’s finding is that the existence of traders who gather and analyze 
bits of publicly available information sell short when they detect that price exceeds 
fundamental value and then truthfully communicate their conclusions to someone in 
the media with the hope of generating a price decline that will allow them to cover 
at a profit (“fundamental-value true-news-spreading short sellers”). Where the trader 
is credible to a person in the media, the person in the media is credible to the trading 
public, and the conclusion involves discrete information relevant in some significant 
way to predicting an issuer’s future cash f lows, one would often expect an abnormal 
negative return to result. Again, the trader, to minimize her risk and lock in her 
profits, would want, as soon as possible after she completes her short sales, to prompt 
the decline in price and to cover. As soon as the short sales are complete, therefore, 
she would communicate her conclusion to a media person. If the media person finds 
the conclusion credible, she would rush to be the first to get the story out. Thus, 
again, the abnormal negative return would be expected to be observed within a few 
days of the elevation in short sales caused by such traders. Unlike the other two 
explanations of the DLW finding, however, it is not illegal for a short seller to base 
trades on this kind of information or truthfully to communicate her conclusions to a 
person in the media. Also, this behavior unambiguously helps to improve share price 
accuracy, with the accompanying social benefits.78
77. See supra Part I.C.4. The fact that these short sales are illegal may have a countervailing tendency on a 
desire of traders otherwise to time the short sales and the spreading of the false news as closely together 
as possible. Concern over detection may prompt the traders to spread the short sales over a longer period 
of time before spreading the false news despite the increased financial risk.
78. See supra Part I.A.
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  iv. Importance of these three kinds of trading. As discussed immediately below, 
none of the other kinds of short selling that we can identify appear to be likely 
explanations of the DLW finding. Thus, the DLW finding suggests that the three 
kinds of trading already discussed, in the aggregate, exist in sufficient amounts above 
and beyond the other kinds of short selling discussed below that when they occur, 
they are statistically significant. DLW’s study does not, however, contain any 
information concerning the relative importance of these three kinds of short selling.
 c. Short selling activity that does not explain the DLW finding. We can identify three 
other kinds of short selling: (i) portfolio-adjusting short selling, (ii) fundamental-
analysis non-news-spreading short selling, and (iii) distant-announcement 
inside-information short selling. None of these likely explain the DLW finding.
  i. Portfolio-adjusting short sellers. “Portfolio-adjusting short sellers” are persons 
who sell short for portfolio adjusting reasons such as hedging, liquidity provision, or 
other risk-related reasons. These short sales are unrelated to information or news. 
Because abnormal returns typically reflect the incorporation of new information into 
prices, the timing of these short sales should not be associated with the timing of 
abnormal returns. Trades based on these motives are not illegal and they serve 
socially useful purposes.
  ii. Fundamental-analysis non-news-spreading short sellers. “Fundamental-
analysis non-news-spreading short sellers” are traders who gather and analyze bits of 
publicly available information, sell short when they detect that price exceeds 
fundamental value, and profit by covering after the price declines with the 
disappearance of the deviation. These short sales are similarly not illegal and they 
are unambiguously socially beneficial in terms of improving share price accuracy. 
They also cannot explain the DLW result. The fundamental-analysis trader who 
sells short and then truthfully communicates her conclusion to someone in the media 
in a way that results in a significant price change, discussed above as a possible 
explanation of DLW’s finding, is a special case. This special case requires that the 
fundamental analysis trader’s conclusion involves discrete information relevant in 
some significant way to predicting an issuer’s future cash f lows, that the trader has 
credibility, both as to her honesty and her skill in fact-gathering and analysis, and 
that this credibility be with a person in the media who in turn has credibility with 
the trading public. Outside of this special case, the rest of short selling motivated by 
fundamental analysis will not explain the DLW finding.
 To see why much of fundamental-analysis-based short selling will not explain 
DLW’s finding, consider the ways, outside of the special case, that the deviation 
between share price and fundamental value detected by a short seller can disappear. 
One way is for an issuer to make a public announcement that reveals the underlying 
reality about the issuer’s situation that the short seller detected. Such an announcement 
would often generate an abnormal negative return.
 Typically, however, the short sale based on a trader’s detection of the deviation 
would have occurred more than five days earlier. This is because the change in 
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fundamental value that originally generated the deviation would in most cases have 
developed more than five days in advance of the public announcement. Where the 
deviation exists well before the announcement, so does the opportunity to profit 
from detecting it. Thus there is no reason to believe that the expected return from 
information gathering, analyzing, and trading on the conclusion, and hence the level 
of this activity, would be significantly higher in the few days immediately preceding 
the public announcement that ends the deviation than at any other point in time 
during the period that the deviation persists. So the elevation in short sales associated 
with these kinds of trades would not be expected to be concentrated in the few days 
immediately preceding the announcement that finally clarifies the situation and the 
accompanying abnormal negative return. Such trades, therefore, even when the 
deviation motivating them is eliminated by an issuer announcement generating a 
negative return, are not what are being picked up in the DLW finding.
 A second way for the deviation between price and fundamental value detected by 
the short seller to disappear is the result of trading activity by other traders when 
they subsequently privately learn, directly or through trade decoding, of the first 
short seller’s analysis, or when they engage in similar gathering and analysis and 
come to the same conclusion. This process would not typically result in a discrete 
price reaction resulting in an abnormal return on a single day and thus also would 
not explain DLW’s findings, which relate abnormal returns to immediately preceding 
elevated levels of short sales.
 A third way for the price deviation detected by the short seller to disappear is 
when the events predicted by the short seller’s changed evaluation become publicly 
known and reflected in price without an issuer announcement. For the same reasons 
as when the deviation disappears because of an issuer public announcement, this 
process would typically take longer than five days. Moreover, public awareness might 
occur slowly and therefore not even generate a large enough negative return on any 
given day for the returns that were observed for the day to be likely to be considered 
abnormal.
  iii. Distant-announcement inside-information short sellers. We argued earlier 
that a significant portion of short selling based on confidential information from 
inside an issuer that is relevant to predicting a future negative announcement occurs 
within the five days preceding the announcement. There are also many instances, 
though, where such confidential information becomes available to traders more than 
five days in advance of the announcement and becomes the basis of a short sale soon 
after receipt (“distant-announcement inside-information short sellers”). Any abnormal 
negative return that accompanies the announcement when it is finally made would 
therefore be more than five days after the elevation in the aggregate level of short 
sales resulting from such trades and therefore could not explain the DLW finding. 
Of course, the price might drop in advance of the announcement as the result of sales 
by other traders when they either subsequently privately learn, directly or through 
trade decoding, of the first short seller’s information, or when they receive the 
information from the inside themselves. This process would not typically result in a 
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discrete price reaction resulting in an abnormal return on a single day, and thus also 
would not explain the DLW finding. This stretching out of the price impact is 
especially likely because of the legal risks associated with trading on such information 
or passing it to others.
iV. thE stUdY
 Our study examined whether there is evidence of a relationship between 
significant news about an issuer in the media and the level of short selling of its 
shares. This news is likely to have come to the media from one of four sources: (i) the 
issuer itself or its insiders, (ii) research based on gathering and analyzing publicly 
available bits of data by a person who is not involved in trading in the issuer’s securities 
in advance of the news or in giving private advice to someone who is doing so, (iii) 
research based on gathering and analyzing publicly available bits of data by a person 
who is trading in the issuer’s securities in advance of the news or is giving advice to 
someone who is, and (iv) someone who spreads false news in order to trade in the 
issuer’s shares in a way that takes advantage of the impact of the false news on the 
price of the shares.
 A. Short Selling Data
 Our sample of short selling activity consisted of two subsamples. The first 
subsample came from NYSE data and covered daily short selling activity for all 
NYSE stocks from the period January 3, 2000 to September 30, 2002. The second 
subsample of short sales data starts on January 3, 2005 and ends on July 6, 2007, 
beginning just before Rule 202T’s implementation and ending just before the pilot 
ended. These short sales data consist of approximately 3000 test and control firms in 
the Rule 202T test.79 The number of issuers experiencing at least some shorting 
activity on a given day in our sample ranged from 1930 to 2625, and gradually 
increased over time. There were in total approximately 2.3 million firm days in the 
sample.
 Our source of news about each of the issuers in the sample was the Dow Jones 
Newswires. Thus, for a story, whether true or false, to be detected as news in our 
study, it had to be sufficiently credible and broadly spread such that it was picked up 
by, or influenced the opinion of, either someone in the media or an analyst or other 
commentator who is covered by the media. A day was defined as the period from the 
close of the market on one calendar trading day until the close of the market the next 
calendar trading day. Out of the 2.3 million firm days in our sample, there was news 
in about 416,000, or 18%. In 114,000 of these, the only news about the issuer arrived 
during the trading hours of a day (9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.). In 232,000 of these, the 
only news about the issuer arrived during the day’s pre-market, non-trading hours 
(from 4:00 p.m. of the immediately preceding calendar day on which there had been 
trading to 9:30 a.m. when trading began again). In the remaining 70,000 cases, news 
79. See supra Part II.B.1.
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arrived about the issuer during both the trading hours of a day and the day’s pre-
market hours.
 B. Measure of the Content of the News
 Our measure of the content of the news related to the percentage of total words 
in an article about an issuer that were designated as negative.80 The list of words that 
were determined to be negative was based on the Harvard-IV-4 psychosocial 
dictionary81 and a financial negative-word list developed by Loughran and 
McDonald.82 This type of content analysis approach, using the Harvard-IV-4 
dictionary to analyze the import of text in the media, has been employed before both 
in finance literature83 and in the social sciences more generally.84 In our study, all the 
words that were on the list of negative words were considered to be equally 
important—i.e., equally negative—and all other words were considered to be 
uninformative. The negativity of a news story was measured by the percentage of 
words in the story that were negative according to the two lists.85 This measure of 
negativity is obviously crude, but it has no obvious bias. Indeed, its noisiness would 
work against our finding a result. Counteracting the noisiness of the measure is the 
fact that the number of observations that we employed was huge, from the tens to 
hundreds of thousands, depending on the test.
 Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (“TSM”) have previously used the 
Harvard-IV-4 dictionary to measure the content of media reports about individual 
issuers. TSM showed a statistically significant relationship between the level of 
80. We identified an article containing news about an issuer by using the Dow Jones ticker codes in the 
article header. Each issuer with a Dow Jones ticker code in the article header received the same negative 
word count. We restricted the sample to articles mentioning either one or two firms, in order to increase 
the likelihood that the news was relevant for the firms included in the article header. To increase the 
likelihood that the article had some relevance for firm valuation, we used only articles containing at 
least twenty-five words in total and at least one of the following words: “press release,” “earn,” “net 
income,” “profit,” “sales,” “revenue,” “trade,” “buy,” “sell,” “gain,” “loss,” “rumor,” “analyst,” and common 
alternative forms of each such word.
81. Harvard-IV-4 Dictionary, Internet General Inquirer, http://www.webuse.umd.edu:9090/tags/TAGNeg.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (listing each word in the negative category). 
82. Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, When is a Liability not a Liability? Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 
10-Ks, J. Fin. (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1331573.
83. See Paul C. Tetlock, Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market, 62 J. 
Fin. 1139 (2007); Paul C. Tetlock, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky & Sofus Macskassy, More than Words: 
Quantifying Language to Measure Firms’ Fundamentals, 63 J. Fin. 1437 (2008).
84. For a survey, see Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy & Frederick G. Fico, Analyzing Media Messages: 
Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1998).
85. Our final negative measure equals two-thirds times the percentage from the financial negative word list 
plus one-third times the percentage from the Harvard-IV-4 list. The weightings are designed to offset 
the fact that words on the Harvard-IV-4 list occur approximately twice as often as words on the financial 
negative-word list. Aside from these weightings, all the words that are on the negative-word lists are 
considered to be equally important—i.e., equally negative—and all other words are considered to be 
uninformative.
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negativity in media reports about an issuer and subsequent returns on the issuer’s 
shares.86 Specifically, the TSM study found that stock market prices respond to the 
information imbedded in negative words with a small one-day delay.87 They also 
found that, even after controlling for analysts’ forecasts and historical accounting 
data, the relative frequency of negative words predicts subsequently reported firm 
earnings.88 This second finding suggests that the frequency of negative words 
contains meaningful additional information relevant to better predicting an issuer’s 
future cash f lows.
V. rEsULts and intErprEtatiOn
 Consider Day 0 to relate to a calendar day on which there has been trading. Day 
0 was defined as the period that ran from the 4:00 p.m. close of trading on the 
immediately preceding calendar day on which there had been trading through to the 
close of trading at 4:00 p.m. on the calendar day to which Day 0 relates. Day 1 was 
the similarly defined period running from the end of Day 0; Day 2 the similarly 
defined period running from the end of Day 1. To illustrate, suppose a Friday and 
the succeeding Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday were all trading days and Day 0 
related to the Monday. Day 0 would run from the preceding Friday at 4:00 p.m. to 
Monday at 4:00 p.m.; Day 1 would run from Monday at 4:00 p.m. to Tuesday at 4:00 
p.m.; and Day 2 would run from 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday to 4:00 p.m. on Wednesday. 
Day 0 was subdivided into its pre-market hours (4:00 p.m. of the immediately 
preceding calendar day on which there had been trading until 9:30 a.m. of the 
calendar day to which Day 0 relates) and the trading hours (the remainder of Day 0, 
running from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. of the calendar day to which Day 0 relates). Day 
1 and Day 2 were similarly subdivided.
 A. Abnormally High Short Selling in Day 0
 Our first major finding is that when, during the trading hours of Day 0, there is an 
abnormally high level of short selling in an issuer’s shares (relative to the preceding 
nine trading days), the news concerning the issuer in the pre-market hours of Day 1 is 
more negative than average. This finding persists even after controlling for the tendency 
of negative news during Day 0 to foreshadow the negative news on Day 1.89
86. Tetlock et al., More than Words, supra note 83, at 1439.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. We implemented this test using a linear regression of news negativity on abnormal short selling activity. 
Table 1 reports the coefficients and standard errors from two such regressions. We measured short 
selling (short_0) in the trading hours of Day 0 and news negativity (pre_neg_1) in the pre-market hours 
of Day 1. Key control variables include percentage news negativity in the pre-market and trading hours 
in Day 0 (pre_neg_0 and trad_neg_0), the firm’s market-adjusted stock returns (abret_0), its abnormal 
trading volume (volm_0), and its market capitalization (size_0). The standard errors of the regression 
coefficients adjusted for correlations among different firms’ stock returns in the same day. The coefficient 
on the short_0 variable measured the ability of short selling on Day 0 to predict pre-market news 
negativity on Day 1. In the first regression in Table 1, which contains the entire sample, the short_0 
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  1. Kinds of Short Selling that Explain the Finding
 This first major finding is likely the result of one or more of the three kinds of 
short selling—near-announcement inside-information short selling, false-news-
spreading short selling, and fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short 
selling—that also constitute the likely explanations of DLW’s first finding.
 There are good reasons to believe that the short sales of near-announcement 
inside-information short sellers would, relative to other days, occur more frequently 
in the trading day immediately before the issuer’s announcement of the information 
on which the short sellers are trading. Many of the short sales based on this 
information will not occur before this point because the short sellers do not receive 
the information until then, at least not in sufficiently reliable form. Also, even when 
a trader receives this information in reliable form earlier, she may postpone her short 
sale based on it until just before the announcement in order to minimize the time 
between the short sale and the time of cover. Doing so minimizes the risks associated 
with other factors that move the issuer’s share price around over time.90
 For similar reasons, false-news-spreading short sellers and fundamental-analysis 
true-news-spreading short sellers will also each be expected to be more concentrated 
right before the announcement of the news that they spread. Such traders will want 
to postpone their short sale until just before spreading the news, again in order to 
minimize risk by minimizing the time between the short sale and the time of cover.
  2. Kinds of Short Selling that Do Not Explain the Finding
 None of the three remaining kinds of short selling that we have identified—
portfolio-adjusting short selling, fundamental-analysis non-news-spreading short 
selling, and distant-announcement inside-information short selling—is likely to help 
explain our first major finding.
 Because portfolio-adjusting short selling is unrelated to information, there is no 
reason to think it would be concentrated in advance of news in the media about an 
issuer. As for fundamental-analysis non-news-spreading short selling, the deviation 
between share price and fundamental value that is detected by the trader and prompts 
the short sale may ultimately be dissipated as the result of news in the media. But, for 
the reasons discussed earlier concerning why such traders do not explain DLW’s first 
finding, there is no reason to think that detection of such deviations, and the resulting 
coefficient is equal to 0.04% and is marginally statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value = 0.061). 
See infra Table 1.
 The next two regressions divide the sample into two subsamples where we separately analyze the 
cases in which short selling is above average (short_0 > 0) and below average (short_0 ≤ 0). In the above-
average short selling sample, set out in the second column of Table 1, the short_0 coefficient is equal to 
0.18% and is statistically significant at any conventional level (p-value < 0.001). In the below-average 
short selling sample, when short_0 is less than zero, set out in the last column in Table 1, the regression 
coefficient of pre_neg_1 on short_0 is significantly negative (p-value = 0.004). See infra Table 1.
90. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. A countervailing force would be the desire to use the 
information ahead of possible trading by others based on the same information, thus avoiding the price 
effects of the other trades.
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short sales, would be concentrated right before this news story.91 Moreover, the 
deviation may well disappear without there ever being a news story relating to it, 
either through the price effect of the sales of other traders who also become aware of 
the deviation or as the result of gradual public awareness of the true situation.92 As 
for distant-announcement inside-information short sellers, news related to the 
announcement would, by definition, not occur immediately after the short sales.
  3.  Further Evidence Concerning the Importance of the Kinds of Short Selling 
Explaining the Finding
 Related results from our study tend to confirm the importance of near-
announcement inside-information short sellers, false-news-spreading short sellers, 
and fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short sellers and their role in 
explaining our first major finding. We find, consistent with DLW, that above-
average short selling of an issuer’s shares during the trading hours of Day 0 predicts 
below-average returns during the trading hours of Day 1. But we also find that this 
ability of the level of short selling to predict the next day’s returns is greater when 
there is pre-market news on Day 1 concerning the issuer than where there is no news 
concerning the issuer during these pre-market hours.93
 The relevance of these results to our first major finding can be seen as follows. 
Short selling on Day 0 might be elevated for one of two reasons. One reason is stochastic 
variation in the level of portfolio-adjusting short selling, fundamental-analysis non-
news-spreading short selling, or distant-announcement inside-information short 
selling. The other reason is an increase in near-announcement inside-information short 
selling, false-news-spreading short selling, or fundamental-analysis true-news-
spreading short selling. When the elevation in the aggregate level of short selling is due 
to the first reason, one would not expect it to predict below-average returns the next 
day. Nor would it predict the existence of news about the issuer in the next day’s pre-
market hours. In contrast, when the elevation is due to the second reason, one would 
expect such short selling to predict the next day’s returns. Moreover, there is also more 
likely to be news about the issuer because these kinds of short selling are either made 
in anticipation of such news or are actually tied to prompting it. Our results—that 
when there is news about the issuer in the pre-market hours of Day 1, elevated short 
91. See supra Part III.C.2.c.ii.
92. See supra Part III.C.2.c.ii.
93. The columns in Table 2 report the results from two regressions predicting the firm’s market-adjusted 
returns on Day 1 (abret_1) using abnormal short selling activity on Day 0 (short_0) and other variables. 
Both regressions include an interaction term between abnormal short selling activity on Day 0 and the 
presence of pre-market news on Day 1 (short_0 * pre_news_0). The economically and statistically significant 
(p-values < 0.01) negative interaction coefficients show that short selling on Day 0 is a better predictor of 
stock returns on Day 1 when the firm experiences a pre-market news event on Day 1. In the second 
specification with additional control variables, a 100% increase in short selling (relative to daily volume) 
predicts a return that is 17 basis points below average when there is no news on Day 1, whereas it predicts 
a return of 41 basis points below average when there is news on Day 1. See infra Table 2.
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selling in Day 0 better predicts below-average returns in Day 1—are consistent with 
these expectations.
  4. The Relative Roles of the Kinds of Short Selling that Do Explain the Finding
 Related results from our study also hint at the relative roles of the three kinds of 
short selling that could plausibly explain our first major finding. These related results 
suggest that traders who sell short and then spread news, whether true or false, play 
a significant explanatory role. Specifically, we observe from our first major finding 
that when short selling is above normal on Day 0, there is a positive, highly statistically 
significant relationship between the level of short selling on Day 0 and the negativity 
of news in the pre-market hours of Day 1 (see the second regression in Table 1).94 In 
contrast, we find that when the level of short selling is below normal on Day 0, there 
is not a positive relationship between the level of short selling during the trading 
hours of Day 0 and the level of negative news in the pre-market hours of Day 1 
(indeed, as the third regression in Table 1 shows, it is negative).95
 Our explanation of why we find a positive relationship between the level of short 
selling and the negativity of the news when short selling is above average, but do not 
find this result when short selling is below average, depends on combining it with 
the twin findings of CFA—that short selling activity in the five trading days 
preceding a positive earnings announcement surprise was below-normal and that it 
was unusually low in advance of an unusually large positive surprise—and with the 
fact that a below-normal level of negative news represents positive news.96
 Imagine two worlds. In the first world, there is no short selling during the trading 
hours of Day 0 by persons who would then spread news during the pre-market hours 
of Day 1—i.e., there are no false-news-spreading short sellers and no fundamental-
analysis true-news-spreading short sellers. Short selling would come from the other 
four groups of traders. As just noted, we would not expect to find a positive 
relationship between the level of short selling during the trading hours of Day 0 and 
the level of negative news during the pre-market hours of Day 1 for three of these 
four groups: portfolio-adjusting short sellers, fundamental-analysis non-news-
spreading short sellers, and distant-announcement inside-information short sellers.
 We would, however, expect to find a positive relationship between the level of 
near-announcement inside-information short selling during the trading hours of Day 
0 and the level of negative news during the pre-market hours of Day 1. This would 
not just be unusually high levels of short selling preceding unusually negative news; 
94. The t statistic is 4.40. In other words, we can reject with greater than 99.9% confidence the hypothesis 
that the results showing this relationship are due only to chance. See supra note 89.
95. See supra note 94.
96. TSM found that tests measuring the relative optimism or pessimism of news articles using both words 
designated as positive in the Harvard-IV-4 psychosocial dictionary and words designated there as 
negative produce very similar results to the test, employed here, that simply uses negative words. Tetlock, 
Saar-Tsechansky & Macskassy, supra note 83, at 1442. Putting this comparison of tests a different way, 
it suggests that if an article has a below-normal level of negative words, it is likely to have an above-
normal level of positive words.
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it would also be unusually low levels of short selling preceding unusually positive 
news. This latter expectation arises from the CFA finding that unusually low levels 
of short selling activity immediately precede unusually large positive earnings 
surprises—thus suggesting that unusually low levels of short selling by this group 
during the trading hours of Day 0 would be followed by an unusually low level of 
negative news in the pre-market hours of Day 1. When the level of short selling is 
below average, however, we in fact do not find such a positive relationship between 
the level of short selling and the negativity of the news that follows.
 The second world is the same as the first world except that instead of leaving out 
false-news-spreading short sellers and fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading 
short sellers, we leave out near-announcement inside-information short sellers. 
Again, we would expect not to find a positive relationship between the level of short 
selling during the trading hours of Day 0 and the level of negative news during the 
pre-market hours of Day 1 for three of the five groups: portfolio-adjusting short 
sellers, fundamental-analysis non-news-spreading short sellers, and distant-
announcement inside-information short sellers. As for false-news-spreading short 
selling and fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling, there would 
probably be no such short selling on most days for the typical issuer. But on occasional 
days there would be. On these occasional days, when there are news-spreading short 
sellers, the negative news that they spread in the pre-market hours of the next trading 
day would add to any existing negative news about an issuer. For the rest of the days, 
when there is no such short selling, the level of negative news about the issuer in the 
pre-market hours of the next trading day would be determined by other factors.
 Suppose that in this second world, on the occasional day when either type of 
news-spreading short selling occurs, it adds substantially to the total number of short 
sales that day. On the other days, when there is no news-spreading short selling in an 
issuer’s shares, the amount of short selling would therefore typically be below average 
(the average being boosted by the substantial extra short sales on the days when there 
is news-spreading short selling). And on the days when there is no news-spreading 
short selling, the level of negative news in the pre-market hours of the next trading 
day would be unrelated to the factors that lead to other types of short selling. On the 
occasional day where there is news-spreading short selling, the level of short selling 
would typically be above average and the level of negative news in the pre-market 
hours of the next trading day would be determined in part by the news that these 
short sellers spread. In this second world, we would expect that the pattern of short 
sales and next-day news would resemble what we observe in our study: the existence 
of a positive, statistically significant relationship between the level of short selling 
during the trading hours of Day 0 and negative news in the pre-market hours of Day 
1 when short selling activity is above average, but no such positive relationship 
between the two when the short selling activity is below average.
 These two worlds are of course somewhat stylized and our account does not 
include an explanation of why the below-average short selling results do not just 
show an absence of a positive relationship between the level of short selling and the 
negativity of the news that follows, but also the existence of an actual negative 
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relationship. Nevertheless, the fact that our results do not resemble what we would 
expect to see if we were operating in the first world tells us something about the real 
world where near-announcement inside-information short selling, false-news-
spreading short selling, and fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling 
are all possible. The results at least hint that the latter two, in some combination, 
play a significant role worthy of detailed study. This is particularly so because false-
news-spreading short selling is unambiguously socially harmful, whereas 
fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling results in a socially beneficial 
improvement in share price accuracy.
 B.  The Effect of Day 0 Short Selling on Day 1 Price Reaction to Pre-Market Negative News
  1. Finding
 Our second major finding is that when the news concerning an issuer in the pre-
market hours or trading hours of Day 1 has higher negativity than average news, the 
negative price reaction during the trading hours of Day 1 is smaller if, during the 
trading hours of Day 0, there was an abnormally high level of short selling of the 
issuer’s shares (relative to the preceding nine days).97
  2. Types of Short Selling that Potentially Explain the Finding
 This second major finding can yet again be the result of any one or more of the 
three kinds of short selling that constituted the likely explanations of our first major 
finding: near-announcement inside-information short selling, false-news-spreading 
short selling, and fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling. Also 
again, none of the other three kinds of short selling that we have identified is likely 
to help explain this second major finding.
  3. Explanation
 Consider the following explanation of this second major finding. Market 
participants on Day 1 have some idea of the level of short selling in an issuer’s stock 
97. This finding persists even after controlling for the tendency for unusually negative news during Day 0 
to foreshadow unusually negative news on Day 1. Column one in Table 3 displays the results from a 
linear regression in which we introduce interaction terms ((short_0 > 0) * pre_neg_1 and (short_0 > 0) * 
trad_neg_1) between above-average short selling on Day 0 (short_0 > 0) and pre-market negativity 
(pre_neg_1) or trading hours negativity (trad_neg_1) on Day 1 to measure this effect. The dependent 
variable in this test is the firm’s market-adjusted return on Day 1 (abret_1). The regression includes 
control variables for short selling activity on Day -1 and negativity in the pre-market and trading hours 
of Day -1, among other variables. When short selling on Day 0 is equal to its average, the firm’s 
abnormal return on Day 1 is 13.7 basis points below normal when pre-market negativity on Day 1 is 1% 
above average. When short selling on Day 0 is above average, the firm’s abnormal return on Day 1 is 
11.2 basis points (= 13.7 bps – 2.5 bps) below normal when pre-market negativity on Day 1 is 1% above 
average. The abnormal return response on Day 1 to a 1% increase in negativity during the trading hours 
of Day 1 declines from -17.3 basis points to -13.0 basis points (= 17.3 bps – 4.3 bps) when short selling 
on Day 0 is above average. In both cases, the difference in the return response is statistically significant 
at the 5% level (p-values = 0.028 and 0.004). See infra Table 3.
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on Day 0. When market participants observe an unusually high aggregate level of 
short selling on a given day, they know there is an increased chance that one of the 
three explanatory kinds of short selling is occurring.98 The increased likelihood that 
any of these three kinds of short selling occurred during the trading hours of Day 0 
will, for the reasons discussed below, lead participants to discount the importance of 
negative news during the pre-market hours of Day 1, and thus its price impact during 
the trading hours of Day 1.
 a. Near-announcement inside-information short selling. To isolate the effect of near-
announcement inside-information short selling, suppose that there was no possibility 
of false-news-spreading short selling or fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading 
short selling. Suppose also that a piece of negative news, with a given downward 
implication in terms of predicting an issuer’s future cash f lows, becomes public 
during the pre-market hours of Day 1.
 Imagine two worlds. In the first world, there is no near-announcement inside-
information short selling, perhaps because there are very effective legal rules against 
insider trading, tipping, and trading on tipped information. In the first world, the 
level of short selling on Day 0 would be determined stochastically, independent of 
any news to be announced on Day 1, and we would therefore not expect to see any 
relation between the level of short selling and the price reaction to the negative news 
on Day 1.
 In the second world, there is such short selling: negative confidential inside 
information does sometimes leak out and becomes the basis of short sales. Other 
times, however, negative confidential inside information does not leak out before it is 
announced. There is also information external to the firm but that is relevant to 
predicting future cash f lows and is not traded on before its public availability. In this 
second world, when there is negative news in the pre-market hours of Day 1, we 
would expect to see a relationship between the level of short selling during the 
trading hours of Day 0 and the price reaction to this negative news on Day 1. This is 
because sometimes in the second world, negative news that becomes public in the 
pre-market hours of Day 1 reflects inside confidential information that has leaked 
out earlier and become the basis of short selling during the trading hours of Day 0. 
When this happens, the level of short selling would, on average, be abnormally high 
because there would be short sales based on this leaked information in addition to all 
the normally occurring short sales motivated by other considerations. And the price 
reaction to the news on Day 1 would be less than normal because the price would 
already have been negatively influenced during the trading hours of Day 1 by the 
short sales based on the leaked information. Thus, on average, in the second world 
we would expect to observe that when short sales are above normal, negative news in 
the overnight hours afterward will have a smaller price reaction the next day.
98. They are not certain because stochastic f luctuations in the levels of the three non-explanatory kinds of 
short selling, which are unrelated to pre-market news the trading next day, will also inf luence the day’s 
aggregate level of short selling.
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 b. Fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling. To isolate the effect of 
fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling, suppose that there was no 
possibility of false-news-spreading short selling or near-announcement inside-information 
short selling. When participants in the market observe an abnormally high level of short 
selling during the trading hours of Day 0 and then negative news during the pre-market 
hours of Day 1, they know that there is an increased chance that some informed trading 
has already occurred on the basis of the news and so part of its impact on price may 
already have occurred. Thus, on average, we again would expect to observe that when 
short sales are above normal on Day 0, negative news in the overnight hours afterward 
will have a smaller price reaction on Day 1.
 c. False-news-spreading short selling. To isolate the effect of false-news-spreading 
short selling, suppose that there was no possibility of near-announcement inside-
information short selling or fundamental-analysis true-news-spreading short selling. 
When market participants observe an unusually high aggregate level of short selling 
on a given day, they know there is an increased chance that it was due to false-news-
spreading short selling. Thus, when market participants observe a high level of short 
selling during the trading hours of Day 0 followed by negative news during the pre-
market hours of Day 1, market participants have an elevated fear that this negative 
news is false. They will discount it somewhat relative to how they would have 
evaluated the news if they had not observed the high level of short selling. Because of 
this discounting, the negative news will have less of a price impact when trading 
occurs on Day 1.
 C. The Efficiency of the Market Responses Under Study
 Our third major finding is that while the joint pattern of above-normal short 
selling on Day 0 and above-average negativity in news on Day 1 predict below-
normal returns on Day 2 and the next trading day thereafter, we find that the 
predictive content of the negativity does not exhibit a statistically significant 
dependence on the extent of short selling and vice versa.99 Given the power that our 
tests gain from our large number of observations, this finding suggests that if there 
is in fact any relationship with the returns on Day 2 and beyond, it is very small.
 This third major finding suggests that the market is digesting in an efficient and 
rational way whatever it knows about the level of short selling on Day 0 that preceded 
the news on Day 1. The lack of any pattern after the first day suggests that there is 
no lag in processing the implications of this information and no overreaction on Day 
99. The insignificant coefficient on the (short_0 > 0) * pre_neg_1 interaction variable in the second regression 
in Table 3 represents this finding. This regression employs nearly the same independent variables as the 
first regression in Table 3, but the dependent variable is now the firm’s stock returns in Day 2 (abret_2) 
instead of its returns on Day 1. Consistent with previous studies, we find that the coefficients on the 
negativity of news on Day 1 (pre_neg_1 and trad_neg_1) and abnormal short selling on Day 1 (short_1) 
are negative and statistically significant. Our main focus, however, is on the insignificant coefficient on 
the interaction term between abnormal short selling on Day 0 and pre-market negativity on Day 1, 
which indicates that the stock market’s lagged response to negativity does not depend on the extent of 
short selling that precedes news. See infra Table 3.
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1 that requires subsequent correction. This third major finding suggests as well that 
the market’s high-short-selling-in-Day-0 discount of negative news in the pre-market 
hours of Day 1 (revealed by our second major finding) is correct on average.
 Finally, our third major finding suggests that the market estimates well the 
extent to which false-news-spreading short selling plays in explaining our first major 
finding—i.e., that the level of Day 0’s short sales of an issuer’s shares predicts the 
negativity of news about the issuer in the pre-market hours of Day 1. Since the 
market does not know which news stories are the results of false-news-spreading 
short selling, it discounts the implications of all stories to reflect this estimate. To 
the extent that the market figures out within the next nine days which of the negative 
news stories that it accepted as true on Day 1 are really false, the issuers that are the 
victims of the false stories enjoy positive returns. There is a counterbalancing negative 
trend in the returns of the rest of the issuers, where the news was not found not to be 
false. If the market correctly estimates the role of false-news-spreading short selling, 
we would expect that when the returns of these two kinds of issuers are averaged, 
they appear normal. This is what we observe in our third major finding.
Vi. COnCLUsiOn
 This article explores empirically the relationship between short selling and 
subsequent news about an issuer. We have identified three kinds of short selling that 
can be connected with such news. One is short sellers who have obtained confidential 
information that an issuer is about to make a negative announcement. A second is 
short sellers who, after their sales, spread false stories that generate negative news. 
The third is short sellers who, through gathering and analyzing publicly available 
data, have detected that price exceeds fundamental value and, after their sales, spread 
their true conclusions about this disparity, thereby also generating negative news. 
Our study exposes a number of key findings that shed new light on the importance 
of these three news-connected kinds of short selling, both relative to the total amount 
of short selling in the market and relative to each other.
 Our first major finding is that an abnormally high level of short selling during 
the trading hours of one day tends to be followed by a statistically significant elevation 
in the level of negative news about an issuer immediately following these sales. 
According to our analysis, this finding suggests that the three news-connected kinds 
of short selling are in the aggregate sufficiently important, relative to the total 
amount of short selling in the market, to generate statistically significant results. 
The importance of these three news-connected kinds of short selling is reinforced by 
an additional result from our study—above-average short selling of an issuer’s shares 
on one trading day predicts below-average returns the next trading day, but the 
ability of the level of short selling to predict returns is greater when there is news 
concerning an issuer in the pre-market hours of this next trading day. Another result 
from our study—that when the level of short selling is below normal, there is no 
positive relationship between the level of short selling one trading day and the level 
of negative news the next—hints at the relative importance of news-spreading short 
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selling (both false and true) versus short selling based on inside information 
concerning an upcoming issuer announcement, because this is the pattern that we 
would particularly expect news-spreading short selling to display.
 Our second major finding is that when an issuer is the subject of negative news in 
the pre-market hours of a trading day, the price reaction to the news during the trading 
hours that follow is less pronounced where there has been an abnormally high level of 
short selling the day before. This finding is yet another indicator of the significance of 
news-connected short selling relative to the total level of short selling.
 Our third major finding is that the ability of negative news that follows short 
selling to predict returns beyond the next trading day after the short selling does not 
depend on the level of this short selling. This suggests that the market is digesting in 
an efficient and rational way whatever it knows about the level of short selling that 
precedes negative news.
 In sum, while prior empirical studies have suggested that short sales based on 
confidential information that an issuer is about to make a negative earnings surprise 
announcement are significant relative to the total amount of short selling occurring 
immediately in advance of such announcements, the preliminary results of our study 
expand the horizon in two ways. First, they relate to all kinds of news about an issuer, 
not just issuer announcements of negative earnings surprises. Second, the explanation 
of our results relates to all three kinds of news-connected short selling, not just short 
selling based on confidential information from inside an issuer. We have substantial 
evidence that these three kinds of short selling in the aggregate are significant relative 
to the total amount of short selling occurring in advance of negative news. We have 
further evidence that at least hints that news spreading, whether false or true, represents 
a significant portion of all news-connected short selling.
 While our results are not yet sufficiently specific to suggest refinements of 
regulatory policy, they do establish that important things are going on that relate 
short selling to news. They are thus a spur to further research that could guide policy. 
We have evidence relating to both the importance of news-connected short selling in 
general and news-spreading short selling in particular. We currently do not have 
evidence concerning the relative roles of false-news-spreading short selling, which is 
unambiguously socially harmful, versus true-news-spreading short selling, which 
results in socially beneficial improvements in share price accuracy. Thus, the 
regulatory implications of our work depend in part on whether further study will 
reveal the relative proportions of true-news-spreading short selling versus false-news-
spreading short selling and whether it will permit the development of empirical 
indicators of the situations where false-news-spreading short selling is most likely to 
have occurred.100
100. Even if we or others were able to find that false-news-spreading short selling is a significant phenomenon 
on its own, this finding would not, in our view, make a persuasive case for wholesale restrictions on 
short selling. Such a finding would of course reinforce the concern from theory that the availability of 
short selling increases the prevalence of the fraudulent practice of spreading false news and trading to 
take advantage of the resulting distortion in price by making the practice more convenient to undertake. 
See supra Part I.C.4. But, as the overall discussion in Part I demonstrates, this effect is just one piece in 
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 As an additional extension, we want to investigate the negative relation between 
short selling and news during below-average short selling days. We do not have a 
clear explanation here of this result but it is possible that on days in which insiders or 
news spreaders are buying in great volume, traders who effectively act as market 
makers are shorting. Also, our study has so far focused exclusively on the extent to 
which short sales forecast future news. The alternative direction—news forecasting 
short sales—is also of interest. Some traders might, for example, seek to profit by 
spreading false positive news and then selling short at the resulting increased price 
with the knowledge that the price rise will likely be only temporary. If this occurs on 
a regular basis, then good news should on average forecast increased short sales. We 
look forward to further exploring the numerous ways in which short selling and 
news may be related.
a complicated story of social benefits and harms that arise from the availability of short selling. See supra 
Part I. We suspect that in general the benefits of short selling well outweigh the other harms discussed 
earlier, and therefore a finding that false-news-spreading short selling is a significant phenomenon is 
unlikely to tip the balance.
  On the other hand, such a finding, in a telltale way, would spot a light on the more general 
practice of spreading false news and trading to take advantage of the resulting price distortion, and 
show that the practice may be more serious than previously believed. This would suggest that it be the 
object of more serious enforcement efforts.
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TabLE 1: ThE abiLiTy Of ShOrT SELLing TO PrEdicT nEwS nEgaTiViTy
 This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from two linear regressions 
of news negativity on Day 1 (pre_neg_1) on abnormal short selling activity on Day 0 
(short_0). We measure short selling in the 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. interval on Day 0 
and news negativity (in percentages) in the 4:00 p.m. to 9:30 a.m. interval on Day 1 
that follows. The two regressions depicted in columns two and three represent two 
different subsamples. The first column contains all observations, whereas the second 
column contains only observations in which short selling is above normal on Day 0 
(i.e., short_0 is positive). Key control variables include percentage news negativity in 
the pre-market and trading hours in Day 0 (pre_neg_0 and trad_neg_0), the firm’s 
market-adjusted stock returns (abret_0), its abnormal trading volume (volm_0), and 
its market capitalization (size_0). See the text for further details. The standard errors 
of the regression coefficients in parentheses adjust for correlations among different 
firms’ stock returns in the same day. The * and ** marks indicate statistical significance 
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Independent Variables All 
Observations
(short 0 > 0) (short_0 ≤ 0)
short_0 0.042 0.179** -0.150**
(0.022) (0.041) (0.053)
pre_neg_0 0.206** 0.203** 0.208**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
trad_neg_0 0.208** 0.216** 0.202**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
abret_0 -0.865** -0.798** -0.906**
(0.082) (0.129) (0.100)
volm_0 0.033** 0.032** 0.032**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
size_0 0.012** 0.016** 0.011**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)




Observations 307,382 137,548 169,834
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TabLE 2: ThE abiLiTy Of ShOrT SaLES TO PrEdicT STOck rETUrnS On nEwS 
daYs
 This table reports the results from two regressions predicting a firm’s market-
adjusted return on Day 1 (abret_1 in percentages) using abnormal short selling 
activity on Day 0 (short_0) and other variables. Both regressions include an interaction 
term between abnormal short selling activity on Day 0 and the presence of pre-
market news on Day 1 (short_0 * pre_news_0). The two columns present two 
regression specifications: one with the main coefficients of interest and the other that 
includes several additional control variables. Control variables include a pre-market 
news measure (pre_news_0) equal to one when there is at least one story about the 
firm and zero when there are no such stories; a story measure (pre_story_0) equal to 
the square root of the number of newswire messages about a firm; a word measure 
(pre_words_0) equal to the square root of the number of words per newswire; and the 
pre-market news negativity measure (pre_neg_0 in percentages). See the text and 
Table 1 for descriptions of the other variables. The standard errors of the regression 
coefficients in parentheses adjust for correlations among different firms’ stock returns 
in the same day. The * and ** marks indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.















Independent Trading Days 1,295 1,295
Observations 2,881,691 2,881,691
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TabLE 3: ThE cOMbinEd abiLiTy Of ShOrT SaLES and nEgaTiViTy TO PrEdicT 
rEtUrns
 This table displays the results from linear regressions of a firm’s market-adjusted 
stock returns on Day 1 or Day 2 (abret_1 or abret_2) on the interaction between 
abnormal short selling on Day 0 and news negativity on Day 1 ((short_0 > 0) * pre_
neg_1 or (short_0 > 0) * trad_neg_1). The regression includes control variables for 
short selling activity on Days 0 and 1 (short_0 or short_1) and news negativity in the 
pre-market and trading hours of Day 0 (pre_neg_1 or trad_neg_1), in addition to the 
market capitalization, trading volume, and news variables described earlier. See the 
text and Tables 1 and 2 for descriptions of the other variables. The standard errors of 
the regression coefficients in parentheses adjust for correlations among different 
firms’ stock returns in the same day. The * and ** marks indicate statistical significance 
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.












(short_0 > 0) * trad_neg_1 0.043** 0.002
(0.015) (0.009)
R2 0.35% 0.19%
Independent Trading Days 1,295 1,284
Observations 439,567 437,501
